From Summary
After the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole, evidence accumulated that it had been launched by al Qaeda operatives, but without confirmation that Bin Ladin had given the order. The Taliban had earlier been warned that it would be held responsible for another Bin Ladin attack on the United States. The CIA described its findings as a “preliminary judgment”; President Clinton and his chief advisers told us they were waiting for a conclusion before deciding whether to take military action. The military alternatives remained unappealing to them.
The transition to the new Bush administration in late 2000 and early 2001 took place with the Cole issue still pending. President George W.Bush and his chief advisers accepted that al Qaeda was responsible for the attack on the Cole, but did not like the options available for a response.
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The Bush administration began developing a new strategy with the stated goal of eliminating the al Qaeda threat within three to five years.
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While the United States continued disruption efforts around the world, its emerging strategy to eliminate the al Qaeda threat was to include an enlarged covert action program in Afghanistan, as well as diplomatic strategies for Afghanistan and Pakistan. The process culminated during the summer of 2001 in a draft presidential directive and arguments about the Predator aircraft, which was soon to be deployed with a missile of its own, so that it might be used to attempt to kill Bin Ladin or his chief lieutenants. At a September 4 meeting, President Bush’s chief advisers approved the draft directive of the strategy and endorsed the concept of arming the Predator. This directive on the al Qaeda strategy was awaiting President Bush’s signature on September 11, 2001.
From detailed report.
During the long contest after election day,the CIA set up an office in Crawford to pass intelligence to Bush and some of his key advisers.157Tenet, accompanied by his deputy director for operations, James Pavitt, briefed President-elect Bush at Blair House during the transition.President Bush told us he asked Tenet whether the CIA could kill Bin Ladin,and Tenet replied that killing Bin Ladin would have an effect but would not end the threat.President Bush told us Tenet said to him that the CIA had all the authority it needed.158
In February 2001,President Bush wrote General Musharraf on a number of matters.He emphasized that Bin Ladin and al Qaeda were “a direct threat to the United States and its interests that must be addressed.”He urged Musharraf to use his influence with the Taliban on Bin Ladin and al Qaeda.214Powell and Armitage reviewed the possibility of acquiring more carrots to dangle in front of Pakistan.Given the generally negative view of Pakistan on Capitol Hill,the idea of lifting sanctions may have seemed far-fetched, but perhaps no more so than the idea of persuading Musharraf to antagonize the Islamists in his own government and nation.215
In March 2001,Rice asked the CIA to prepare a new series of authorities for covert action in Afghanistan.Rice’s recollection was that the idea had come from Clarke and the NSC senior director for intelligence, Mary McCarthy, and had been linked to the proposal for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks.Rice described the draft document as providing for “consolidation plus,”superseding the various Clinton administration documents.In fact,the CIA drafted two documents.One was a finding that did concern aid to opponents of the Taliban regime;the other was a draft Memorandum of Notification,which included more open-ended language authorizing possible lethal action in a variety of situations.Tenet delivered both to Hadley on March 28.The CIA’s notes for Tenet advised him that “in response to the NSC request for drafts that will help the policymakers review their options,each of the documents has been crafted to provide the Agency with the broadest possible discretion permissible under the law.”At the meeting,Tenet argued for deciding on a policy before deciding on the legal authorities to implement it.Hadley accepted this argument,and the draft MON was put on hold.235 As the policy review moved forward,the planned covert action program for Afghanistan was included in the draft presidential directive,as part of an “Annex A”on intelligence activities to “eliminate the al Qaeda threat.”236 The main debate during the summer of 2001 concentrated on the one new mechanism for a lethal attack on Bin Ladin—an armed version of the Predator drone.
In early March,the administration postponed action on proposals for increasing aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks.Rice noted at the time that a more wide-ranging examination of policy toward Afghanistan was needed first.She wanted the review very soon.184 Rice and others recalled the President saying,“I’m tired of swatting at flies.”185The President reportedly also said,“I’m tired of playing defense.I want to play offense. I want to take the fight to the terrorists.”186 President Bush explained to us that he had become impatient.He apparently had heard proposals for rolling back al Qaeda but felt that catching terrorists one by one or even cell by cell was not an approach likely to succeed in the long run.At the same time,he said,he understood that policy had to be developed slowly so that diplomacy and financial and military measures could mesh with one another.187
Hadley convened an informal Deputies Committee meeting on March 7, when some of the deputies had not yet been confirmed. For the first time, Clarke’s various proposals—for aid to the Northern Alliance and the Uzbeks and for Predator missions—went before the group that, in the Bush NSC, would do most of the policy work.Though they made no decisions on these specific proposals,Hadley apparently concluded that there should be a presidential national security policy directive (NSPD) on terrorism.188
The full Deputies Committee discussed al Qaeda on April 30.CIA briefing slides described al Qaeda as the “most dangerous group we face,”citing its “leadership, experience, resources, safe haven in Afghanistan, [and] focus on attacking U.S.”The slides warned,“There will be more attacks.”190 At the meeting,the deputies endorsed covert aid to Uzbekistan.Regarding the Northern Alliance,they “agreed to make no major commitment at this time.”Washington would first consider options for aiding other antiTaliban groups.191Meanwhile,the administration would “initiate a comprehensive review of U.S. policy on Pakistan”and explore policy options on Afghanistan, “including the option of supporting regime change.”192 Working-level officials were also to consider new steps on terrorist financing and America’s perennially troubled public diplomacy efforts in the Muslim world,where NSC staff warned that “we have by and large ceded the court of public opinion”to al Qaeda. While Clarke remained concerned about the pace of the policy review,he now saw a greater possibility of persuading the deputies to recognize the changed nature of terrorism.193The process of fleshing out that strategy was under way.
In May,President Bush announced that Vice President Cheney would himself lead an effort looking at preparations for managing a possible attack by weapons of mass destruction and at more general problems of national preparedness.The next few months were mainly spent organizing the effort and bringing an admiral from the Sixth Fleet back to Washington to manage it.The Vice President’s task force was just getting under way when the 9/11 attack occurred.195
On May 29,at Tenet’s request,Rice and Tenet converted their usual weekly meeting into a broader discussion on al Qaeda;participants included Clarke, CTC chief Cofer Black,and “Richard,”a group chief with authority over the Bin Ladin unit. Rice asked about “taking the offensive”and whether any approach could be made to influence Bin Ladin or the Taliban. Clarke and Black replied that the CIA’s ongoing disruption activities were“taking the offensive”and that Bin Ladin could not be deterred.A wide-ranging discussion then ensued about “breaking the back”of Bin Ladin’s organization.196 Tenet emphasized the ambitious plans for covert action that the CIA had developed in December 2000.In discussing the draft authorities for this program in March,CIA officials had pointed out that the spending level envisioned for these plans was larger than the CIA’s entire current budget for counterterrorism covert action.It would be a multiyear program,requiring such levels of spending for about five years.197 The CIA official,“Richard,”told us that Rice “got it.”He said she agreed with his conclusions about what needed to be done,although he complained to us that the policy process did not follow through quickly enough.198Clarke and Black were asked to develop a range of options for attacking Bin Ladin’s organization,from the least to most ambitious.199
Rice and Hadley asked Clarke and his staff to draw up the new presidential directive.On June 7,Hadley circulated the first draft,describing it as “an admittedly ambitious” program for confronting al Qaeda.200 The draft NSPD’s goal was to “eliminate the al Qida network of terrorist groups as a threat to the United States and to friendly governments.”It called for a multiyear effort involving diplomacy, covert action, economic measures, law enforcement, public diplomacy, and if necessary military efforts.The State Department was to work with other governments to end all al Qaeda sanctuaries, and also to work with the Treasury Department to disrupt terrorist financing.The CIA was to develop an expanded covert action program including significant additional funding and aid to anti-Taliban groups.The draft also tasked OMB with ensuring that sufficient funds to support this program were found in U.S.budgets from fiscal years 2002 to 2006.201
On June 28,Clarke wrote Rice that the pattern of al Qaeda activity indicating attack planning over the past six weeks “had reached a crescendo.”“A series of new reports continue to convince me and analysts at State,CIA,DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency],and NSA that a major terrorist attack or series of attacks is likely in July,”he noted.One al Qaeda intelligence report warned that something “very,very,very,very”big was about to happen,and most of Bin Ladin’s network was reportedly anticipating the attack.In late June,the CIA ordered all its station chiefs to share information on al Qaeda with their host governments and to push for immediate disruptions of cells.17 The headline of a June 30 briefing to top officials was stark:“Bin Ladin Planning High-Profile Attacks.”The report stated that Bin Ladin operatives expected near-term attacks to have dramatic consequences of catastrophic proportions.That same day,Saudi Arabia declared its highest level of terror alert. Despite evidence of delays possibly caused by heightened U.S. security, the planning for attacks was continuing.18
By July,the deputies were moving toward agreement that some last effort should be made to convince the Taliban to shift position and then,if that failed, the administration would move on the significantly enlarged covert action program.As the draft presidential directive was circulated in July,the State Department sent the deputies a lengthy historical review of U.S.efforts to engage the Taliban about Bin Ladin from 1996 on.“These talks have been fruitless,”the State Department concluded.211 Arguments in the summer brought to the surface the more fundamental issue of whether the U.S.covert action program should seek to overthrow the regime,intervening decisively in the civil war in order to change Afghanistan’s government.By the end of a deputies meeting on September 10,officials formally agreed on a three-phase strategy.First an envoy would give the Taliban a last chance.If this failed,continuing diplomatic pressure would be combined with the planned covert action program encouraging anti-Taliban Afghans of all major ethnic groups to stalemate the Taliban in the civil war and attack al Qaeda bases,while the United States developed an international coalition to undermine the regime.In phase three,if the Taliban’s policy still did not change, the deputies agreed that the United States would try covert action to topple the Taliban’s leadership from within.212 The deputies agreed to revise the al Qaeda presidential directive,then being finalized for presidential approval,in order to add this strategy to it.Armitage explained to us that after months of continuing the previous administration’s policy,he and Powell were bringing the State Department to a policy of overthrowing the Taliban.From his point of view,once the United States made the commitment to arm the Northern Alliance,even covertly,it was taking action to initiate regime change,and it should give those opponents the strength to achieve complete victory.213
On July 2, the FBI Counterterrorism Division sent a message to federal agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies summarizing information regarding threats from Bin Ladin.It warned that there was an increased volume of threat reporting,indicating a potential for attacks against U.S.targets abroad from groups “aligned with or sympathetic to Usama Bin Ladin.” Despite the general warnings, the message further stated,“The FBI has no information indicating a credible threat of terrorist attack in the United States.” However,it went on to emphasize that the possibility of attack in the United States could not be discounted. It also noted that the July 4 holiday might heighten the threats.The report asked recipients to “exercise extreme vigilance” and “report suspicious activities”to the FBI.It did not suggest specific actions that they should take to prevent attacks.19 Disruption operations against al Qaeda–affiliated cells were launched involving 20 countries.Several terrorist operatives were detained by foreign governments,possibly disrupting operations in the Gulf and Italy and perhaps averting attacks against two or three U.S.embassies.Clarke and others told us of a particular concern about possible attacks on the Fourth of July.After it passed uneventfully,the CSG decided to maintain the alert.20 To enlist more international help,
Vice President Cheney contacted Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah on July 5.Hadley apparently called European counterparts, while Clarke worked with senior officials in the Gulf. In late July, because of threats,Italy closed the airspace over Genoa and mounted antiaircraft batteries at the Genoa airport during the G-8 summit,which President Bush attended.21At home,the CSG arranged for the CIA to brief intelligence and security officials from several domestic agencies.
On July 5, representatives from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),the FAA,the Coast Guard,the Secret Service,Customs,the CIA,and the FBI met with Clarke to discuss the current threat.Attendees report that they were told not to disseminate the threat information they received at the meeting.They interpreted this direction to mean that although they could brief their superiors,they could not send out advisories to the field.An NSC official recalls a somewhat different emphasis,saying that attendees were asked to take the information back to their home agencies and “do what you can”with it,subject to classification and distribution restrictions.A representative from the INS asked for a summary of the information that she could share with field offices.She never received one.22
In mid-July,reporting started to indicate that Bin Ladin’s plans had been delayed,maybe for as long as two months,but not abandoned.On July 23,the lead item for CSG discussion was still the al Qaeda threat,and it included mention of suspected terrorist travel to the United States.28
The Principals Committee had its first meeting on al Qaeda on September 4. On the day of the meeting,Clarke sent Rice an impassioned personal note.He criticized U.S.counterterrorism efforts past and present.The “real question” before the principals, he wrote, was “are we serious about dealing with the al Qida threat? ...Is al Qida a big deal? ...Decision makers should imagine themselves on a future day when the CSG has not succeeded in stopping al Qida attacks and hundreds of Americans lay dead in several countries,including the US,”Clarke wrote. “What would those decision makers wish that they had done earlier? That future day could happen at any time.”247
Rice told us she took Clarke’s memo as a warning not to get dragged down by bureaucratic inertia.250 While his arguments have force, we also take Clarke’s jeremiad as something more.After nine years on the NSC staff and more than three years as the president’s national coordinator,he had often failed to persuade these agencies to adopt his views,or to persuade his superiors to set an agenda of the sort he wanted or that the whole government could support.
The Defense Department favored strong action. Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz questioned the United States’ability to deliver Bin Ladin and bring him to justice.He favored going after Bin Ladin as part of a larger air strike,similar to what had been done in the 1986 U.S.strike against Libya.General Myers emphasized the Predator’s value for surveillance,perhaps enabling broader air strikes that would go beyond Bin Ladin to attack al Qaeda’s training infrastructure.256
On September 10, Hadley gathered the deputies to finalize their threephase,multiyear plan to pressure and perhaps ultimately topple the Taliban leadership.260 That same day,Hadley instructed DCI Tenet to have the CIA prepare new draft legal authorities for the “broad covert action program”envisioned by the draft presidential directive.Hadley also directed Tenet to prepare a separate section “authorizing a broad range of other covert activities,including authority to capture or to use lethal force”against al Qaeda command-and-control elements. This section would supersede the Clinton-era documents. Hadley wanted the authorities to be flexible and broad enough “to cover any additional UBL-related covert actions contemplated.”261 Funding still needed to be located.The military component remained unclear. Pakistan remained uncooperative.The domestic policy institutions were largely uninvolved.But the pieces were coming together for an integrated policy dealing with al Qaeda,the Taliban,and Pakistan.
Because the amount of reporting is so voluminous,only a select fraction can be chosen for briefing the president and senior officials.During 2001,Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet was briefed regularly regarding threats and other operational information relating to Usama Bin Ladin.1He in turn met daily with President Bush,who was briefed by the CIA through what is known as the President’s Daily Brief (PDB).Each PDB consists of a series of six to eight relatively short articles or briefs covering a broad array of topics; CIA staff decides which subjects are the most important on any given day. There were more than 40 intelligence articles in the PDBs from January 20 to September 10, 2001, that related to Bin Ladin.The PDB is considered highly sensitive and is distributed to only a handful of high-level officials.2
On August 1,the FBI issued an advisory that in light of the increased volume of threat reporting and the upcoming anniversary of the East Africa embassy bombings,increased attention should be paid to security planning.It noted that although most of the reporting indicated a potential for attacks on U.S.interests abroad,the possibility of an attack in the United States could not be discounted.33 On August 3, the intelligence community issued an advisory concluding that the threat of impending al Qaeda attacks would likely continue indefinitely.Citing threats in the Arabian Peninsula,Jordan,Israel,and Europe,the advisory suggested that al Qaeda was lying in wait and searching for gaps in security before moving forward with the planned attacks.34 During the spring and summer of 2001,President Bush had on several occasions asked his briefers whether any of the threats pointed to the United States. Reflecting on these questions,the CIA decided to write a briefing article summarizing its understanding of this danger.Two CIAanalysts involved in preparing this briefing article believed it represented an opportunity to communicate their view that the threat of a Bin Ladin attack in the United States remained both current and serious.35The result was an article in the August 6 Presidential Daily Brief titled “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US.”It was the 36th PDB item briefed so far that year that related to Bin Ladin or al Qaeda,and the first devoted to the possibility of an attack in the United States. The President told us the August 6 report was historical in nature.President Bush said the article told him that al Qaeda was dangerous,which he said he had known since he had become President.The President said Bin Ladin had long been talking about his desire to attack America.He recalled some operational data on the FBI,and remembered thinking it was heartening that 70 investigations were under way.As best he could recollect,Rice had mentioned that the Yemenis’ surveillance of a federal building in New York had been looked into in May and June,but there was no actionable intelligence.
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